We provide an effective procedure for deciding the existence of off-line guessing attacks on security protocols, for a bounded number of sessions.
INTRODUCTION
Guessing attacks (a.k.a. dictionary attacks or brute-force attacks) occur in cryptography when an attacker is able to guess a secret by just trying every possible value for it. In practice this is feasible only when the number of those values (the "dictionary") is small-say 2 32 for a (poor) password or even less for a vote in an election protocol. In this case the secret is called a weak secret.
Fortunately not all weak secrets can be broken. As pointed out by Lowe [18] the attacker must still be able to test whether one of his guesses is correct or not, typically by exploiting redundancy between messages.
Among guessing attacks, by definition, off-line guessing attacks are those for which the attacker does not need to participate in any communication during the guessing phase (but he may have interacted with the honest agents before).
When the size of the dictionary becomes significant, off-line guessing attacks are more feasible in practice than on-line ones and thus are more crucial to detect. On-line guessing attacks may need to send as many requests to the network as the size of the dictionary.
Several attempts have been made, based on the initial work of Lowe [18] , to characterize off-line guessing attacks from a logical point of view and derive formal methods for detecting them [9, 11, 13] . The attempts for a "good" definition currently culminate with Corin et al. [10] . Using the notion of static equivalence from the applied pi calculus [3] , they give a simple and intuitive definition of off-line guessing attacks for an arbitrary set of primitives, modeled by an equational theory. However no automatic procedure is given in [10] and the mentioned examples only deal with passive adversaries.
In this paper we address the question whether the general definition of Corin et al. [10] is suitable for automatic reasoning. We show that the problem of finding off-line guessing attacks is decidable in the case of a bounded number of sessions, for protocols whose set of primitives is described by a convergent subterm rewriting system (see Section 2 for a definition). In particular our class of protocols encompasses the initial Dolev-Yao model [14] and subsequent extensions as in [19, 12, 3, 6, 1] with symmetric encryption, ciphers, compound keys, signatures and hashes.
Our algorithm is based on a procedure for solving a class of second-order E-unification problems. We show that the satisfiability of those constraint systems is decidable, and more remarkably, that the equivalence between two systems (i.e. the equality of their sets of solutions) is decidable.
The purpose of our constraint systems is here to represent symbolic traces of protocols (see e.g. [19, 20, 8, 12] ). We use the equivalence of systems to specify the absence of off-line guessing attacks, by expressing the fact that the intruder cannot distinguish between two versions of the same symbolic trace: one corresponding to a good guess and the other one to a bad guess of the secret.
To our knowledge, this is the first decision procedure for finding such off-line guessing attacks. It is fair to mention, though, that recent releases of Blanchet's tool Proverif [5] do support off-line guessing attacks based on Corin et al.'s definition. In case of success, Blanchet's (non-terminating, approximate) procedure for proving strong secrecy [6] , later refined by [7] , rules out the possibility of on-line/off-line guessing attacks, for an unbounded number of sessions. Our concern is different here, as we look for an exact answer, given by a terminating algorithm, to the security problem for a bounded number of sessions.
Further related work. Delaune and Jacquemard [12] give an NP procedure for verifying trace properties, for a bounded number of sessions, on protocols with explicit destructors. Our algorithm deals with a more general class of security properties, including resistance to off-line guessing attacks. We also relax (and somewhat simplify) the syntactic conditions on the equational theory, by considering convergent subterm rewriting systems instead of convergent public-collapsing rewriting ones (see Section 2).
Abadi and Cortier [1] present an algorithm for deciding static equivalence between closed frames in polynomial time, when the equational theory is given by a convergent subterm rewriting system. Recently, this result has been extended to a more general class of equational theories comprising associative and commutative symbols [2] . This work corresponds to passive adversaries, i.e. pure eavesdroppers. Our procedure can be seen as an extension of [1] to the general case of active adversaries.
Outline of the paper. Section 2 begins with preliminary definitions. We describe our class of constraint systems, called (standard) intruder constraint systems. These correspond to second-order E-unification problems with a number of regularity conditions. Compared to usual unification, though, we allow distinguishing between private and public symbols. Private symbols typically account for secret values not directly available to the intruder. Our main theorem is that: if the equational theory E is presented by a convergent subterm rewriting system and the signature contains an infinite number of public constants, the satisfiability of intruder constraint systems is decidable, and so is the equivalence between standard intruder constraint systems.
We apply this result in Section 3 for deciding trace properties and, more remarkably, the existence of off-line guessing attacks on cryptographic protocols, for a bounded number of sessions.
Section 4 is devoted to the proof of the main theorem. The heart of our decision procedure is a sound and complete set of transformation rules together with a (nondeterministic) terminating strategy, so as to bring any intruder constraint system into a solved form. As such solved forms are always satisfiable, this gives a procedure to decide satisfiability. In order to decide the equivalence of systems, we provide an algorithm for testing whether the set of solutions corresponding to a solved system is included in that of a standard intruder constraint system. We conclude in Section 5.
PRELIMINARIES

Syntax and Basic Definitions
A signature is a set of symbols F together with nonnegative arities. Given an additional set of variables X , we write T (F , X ) for the set of (usual first-order) terms built upon X using the symbols in F .
We assume a given set of symbols F , with elements denoted by f, g . . .Symbols of arity 0 are called constants. F is partitioned into public symbols F pub and private symbols Fpriv. We also use an additional set of constants, called parameters W = {w1, w2 . . . w k . . .}.
We fix a set of variables X , partitioned into first-order variables X 1 , with elements denoted by x, y . . . and secondorder variables X 2 , written X, Y . . . Second-order variables X are given with arities, denoted ar(X). In the following we assume that an infinite number of public constants, resp. first-order variables, second-order variables of each arity, is available.
Elements of T (F , X 1 ) are called first-order terms, and denoted by letters t, s . . . Elements of T (F pub ∪ W, X
2 ) are called second-order terms, and denoted by M, N . . . More generally we use letters T, S . . . for terms in T (F ∪ W, X ) and letter v for variables in X .
We write var(T ), par(T ) for the sets of variables, resp. parameters, occurring in T . A term is closed iff it has no variable, public iff is uses no private symbol. Notice that our second-order terms are always public. We extend the notations var(.) and par(.) to tuples and sets of terms in the obvious way.
Substitutions are written σ = {v1 → T1, . . . , vn → Tn} where we let dom(σ) = {v1 . . . vn} ⊆ X and ∀i, vi = Ti. We write T σ = σ(T ) for the (usual first-order) application of σ to T , σµ = µ • σ for the composition of substitutions. σ is closed iff all the Ti are closed terms, idempotent iff σσ = σ i.e. ∀i, var(Ti) ∩ dom(σ) = ∅. We let var(σ) = {v1 . . For each pair of terms (t1, t2), mgu(t1, t2) denotes a most general unifier of t1 and t2, that is an idempotent substitution µ such that t1µ = t2µ and for every substitution µ , t1µ = t2µ implies µ = µµ .
In the rest of this paper, unless stated otherwise, we only consider well-formed substitutions, that is, substitutions σ which assign first-order variables to first-order terms, and second-order variables X to second-order terms of correct arity: ∀wi ∈ par(Xσ), i ≤ ar(X) and ∀Y ∈ var(Xσ), ar(Y ) ≤ ar(X). Thus, arity represents the maximal index of eligible parameters for substituting a second-order variable.
A (closed public) context is a closed second-order term C given with an arity n ≥ 0, such that par(C) ⊆ {w1 . . . wn}. Each parameter may occur zero, one or several times. If C is n-ary, C[T1 . . . Tn] denotes the result of replacing each w k by T k in C. We extend the notation to second-order terms and may write M [T1 . . . Tn] provided that par(M ) ⊆ {w1 . . . wn}.
A term rewriting system, or simply rewriting system, is a finite set R of rewriting rules l → r, where l, r are firstorder terms. A term T reduces to S by R, written T →R S, iff there exists a rule l → r in R, a position p and a non-necessarily well-formed substitution σ such that T |p = lσ and S = T [p := rσ]. We write → * R for the reflexive and transitive closure of the binary relation →R, =R for its reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure. A term T is R-reduced or equivalently is a R-normal form iff there is no T such that T →R T .
A rewriting system R is terminating iff it admits no infinite sequence of reductions; confluent iff for every T1, T2, T3 such that T1 → * R T2, T1 → * R T3, there exists T4 such that T2 → * R T4, T3 → * R T4; convergent iff it is confluent and terminating.
Intruder Constraint Systems
Constraint solving is by now a standard method for deciding reachability properties in cryptographic protocols for a finite number of sessions [19, 20, 8, 12] . Our purpose is to extend this method to properties that compare the behavior of two systems from the intruder's point of view. This leads us to introduce the following constraint systems and the corresponding notion of satisfiability and equivalence. We shall see in Section 3 how to use these notions to express the security of protocols against off-line guessing attacks. Definition 1. Let R be a rewriting system and Y a set of m pairwise distinct second-order variables X1 . . . Xm. Define ai = ar(Xi) and assume 0 ≤ a1 ≤ a2 ≤ . . . ≤ am. An (R, Y)-intruder constraint system is a system of equations Σ of the form ∃x1 . . . xm,
such that the following regularity conditions hold:
As suggested by the notation above, a solution to Σ is a closed (well-formed) substitution θ with domain dom(θ) = {X1 . . . Xm} such that there exists a closed (well-formed) substitution θ with dom(θ ) = {x1 . . . xm} satisfying the two conditions
Notice that the regularity condition (2) implies that for each closed substitution θ with dom(θ) = {X1 . . . Xm}, there exists a unique θ satisfying condition (i). Indeed, xiθ is computed from (i) by induction on i. Thus, given condition (1), and provided that the word problem for =R is decidable, it is easy to check whether a given θ is a solution.
An intruder constraint system is satisfiable iff it admits at least one solution. Two (R, Y)-intruder constraint systems are equivalent iff they have the same set of solutions. We emphasize that, given our definition of solutions, equivalence of systems does not depend on the exact values of first-order variables. This is crucial for the applications described in Section 3.
Using A rewriting system R is subterm iff: for each rule l → r in R, r is either a proper subterm of l or a closed public R-reduced term. In Section 4 we prove the following result: We leave open the question if it is decidable whether two (non necessarily standard) intruder constraint systems are equivalent. On the other hand, the equivalence problems useful for the applications (Section 3) only involve standard constraint systems.
Following Delaune and Jacquemard [12] , a rewriting system R is public-collapsing iff for every rule l → r ∈ R, the following two conditions hold:
1. r = l and either r ∈ var(l) or r is a public R-reduced term;
2. if l = f (l1 . . . ln) and f ∈ F pub , then for all proper subterms of l of the form g(t1 . . . tm) with g ∈ F pub , we have that either g(t1 . . . tm) is a closed public Rreduced term, or there exists j such that tj = r.
Thus in particular, every public-collapsing rewriting system is subterm according to our definition.
APPLICATION TO SECURITY
In this section we illustrate how to use the intruder constraint systems of Section 2 for analyzing cryptographic protocols w.r.t. trace properties and, more remarkably, resistance to off-line guessing attacks.
Let us consider the following example, called the Handshake protocol [15, 13] :
The goal of these two messages is to authenticate B from A's point of view, provided that they share an initial secret kAB. This is done by a simple challenge-response transaction: A sends a random number (a nonce) encrypted with the secret key kAB; B decrypts this number, applies a given function (e.g. f (N ) = N + 1) to it, and sends the result back, also encrypted with kAB; finally A checks the validity of the result, e.g. by decrypting the message and checking the decryption against f (N ).
We model this protocol using the sets of public symbols F pub = {senc(2), sdec(2), f(1), a, b, i, c1, c2 . . .} and private symbols Fpriv = {k(2), n, n1, n2 . . .} where the numbers in parentheses denote the arities of non-constant symbols. We may write {x}y or senc(x, y) equivalently. The symbols c1, c2 . . . and n, n1, n2 . . . are pools of public, resp. private constants used to model nonces. We equip terms with the following convergent subterm rewriting system R, so as to model a symmetric, deterministic, length-preserving encryption scheme (that is a cipher ):
The second rule states that any message x is a valid ciphertext for any key y. This characteristic property of ciphers is useful for preventing the trivial guessing attack on any message encrypted by a weak key, which arises when decryption fails whenever it is given a wrong decryption key. More generally, we refer the reader to previous work [3, 6, 1, 10] for classical examples on how to model pairs, publickey encryption, hash functions, signatures. . . using convergent subterm rewriting systems.
Symbolic Traces
Informally, a symbolic trace (e.g. [19, 20, 8, 12] ) is an execution trace of the protocol where the messages sent by the intruder (the sizes of which are unbounded) are replaced by fresh variables xi. Each symbolic trace is associated to a constraint system which accounts for the conditions that the messages xi must satisfy for the trace to be feasible. Importantly, we also keep track of the computations Xi done by the attacker to compute the xi. This makes it possible to define a suitable notion of equivalence between traces.
Suppose that we want to prove the authentication property for one session on our example protocol. This boils down to asking whether the intruder I can emulate B in the normal session. The intruder constraint system corresponding to this problem is:
The first equation means that x1, the answer of the intruder, must be computable from the message sent by A using a (public) context X1. The second one is the test done by A upon receiving the second message. This system is easily showed unsatisfiable, either manually or using the procedure of Section 4. (Recall that k is a private symbol so it may not be used in X1.) Hence, there exists no attack on authentication using only one session. More generally, trace properties on security protocols are verified by checking that no symbolic trace corresponding to an attack is satisfiable. This is possible indeed because a bounded number of sessions of a protocol may only generate finitely many symbolic traces [19, 20, 8, 12] .
Off-line Guessing Attacks
A more interesting problem arises if the key k(a, b) is a weak secret, that is, vulnerable to brute-force off-line testing. In [10] , Corin et al. give a general definition of off-line guessing attacks using static equivalence [3, 1] .
Static equivalence usually relates frames [3, 1] , meant to represent sequences of messages sent on the network. In our setting, a frame is a tuple of first-order terms written Φ = {w1 £ t1 . . . wn £ tn} (this notation will prove useful in the next sections). Φ is closed iff all the ti are closed terms. Two closed frames Φ = {w1 £ t1 . . . wn £ tn} and Φ = {w1 £ t 1 . . . wn £ t n } are statically equivalent, written Φ ≈R Φ , iff for all n-ary closed (public) contexts C1 and C2,
Let Σ be an intruder constraint system modeling the satisfiability of a given symbolic trace τ of the protocol, involving a weak secret s. Using the same notation as before, Σ is written ∃x1 . . . xm,
The idea behind Corin et al. [10] 's definition for off-line guessing attacks is the following. Assume that the intruder is given an additional message ta m +1 ∈ {s, s } where s is a fresh private constant. Let θ be a solution to Σ and θ its (unique) extension to first-order variables as before. There is an off-line guessing attack on s at the end of the concrete trace τ θ iff intuitively it is possible for the intruder to distinguish (off-line) whichever ta m +1 = s (correct guess) or ta m +1 = s (wrong guess), that is, in terms of static equivalence:
In terms of intruder constraint systems, we model off-line guessing attacks as follows. Let X, Y be fresh second-order variables of arity am + 1 and x, y fresh first-order variables. For any term t, we define the (X, Y )-standard intruder constraint system Σ[t]: ∃x1 . . . xm, x, y, As an application, the intruder constraint system Σ corresponding to the main session of our example protocol is written:
with ar(X1) = 1, ar(X2) = 2. One solution θ to this system is given by the normal run of the protocol 1 :
Let us define the two systems Σ[k(a, b)] and Σ[s ] as above and extend θ by Xθ = f(sdec (w1, w3) ) and Y θ = sdec(w2, w3). 1 In this sense, the simple example presented here only involves a passive attacker. More complex off-line guessing attacks may be found in [15, 13] .
. This corresponds to the classical guessing attack on the Handshake protocol [15] : by decrypting both messages of the protocols with the guess x and checking the relation
it is possible to test whether x = k(a, b) and thus to recover the weak secret k(a, b) by brute-force testing.
DECISION PROCEDURE
We now describe a decision procedure for the satisfiability and the equivalence of (standard) intruder constraint systems. We begin by introducing extended constraint systems. These can be seen as some syntax for representing (generally infinite) sets of solutions to the initial problem. We then describe a set of transformation rules on the extended systems that is sound and complete for every convergent rewriting system. Finally we show how to enforce termination in the case of convergent subterm rewriting systems, and conclude the proof of Theorem 1.
Due to lack of space, most proofs have been omitted. Detailed proofs are available in the extended version [4] .
Extended Constraint Systems
Let R be a convergent rewriting system and Y a finite set of second-order variables. An (R, Y)-extended constraint system (or simply constraint system in this section) is a tuple Σ = Φ; Ψ; C; σ where
• Φ is a finite set of expressions ∀β.M £ t, called frame rules (or simply rules) of Σ, where β ranges over finite sets of second-order variables;
• Ψ is a finite set of expressions ∀β.M N , called equations of Σ;
• C is a finite set of constraints of the form t1 = ? R t2 and X £ ? t, where in the latter case, X may appear only once in C;
• σ is an idempotent substitution satisfying dom(σ) ∩ var(Φ; Ψ; C) = ∅.
We introduce quantifiers on second-order variables ∀β for technical reasons regarding the termination of the procedure on convergent subterm rewriting systems. Those will be used in Section 4.3 and may be safely ignored for the moment. We apply the usual conventions on binders ∀β. Notably, equality between quantified expressions is understood modulo renaming of bound variables and deletion of useless ones (i.e. ∀β.M = ∀(β ∩ var(M )).M ). We let var(∀β.M £ t) = var(M ) ∪ var(t) − β, var(∀β.M N ) = var(M ) ∪ var(N ) − β. Substitutions are applied accordingly: (∀β.M £ t)σ = ∀β.M σ £ tσ if β ∩ var(σ) = ∅. Besides we see as a commutative symbol. The cryptographic intuition behind the four sets Φ; Ψ; C; σ of each constraint system is the following. A frame rule ∀β.M £ t in Φ records the fact that a term t is computable (or deducible [1] ) by the intruder using any computation (or recipe) M µ, with dom(µ) ⊆ β. Initially, recipes are simply parameters w1 . . . wa m and the set of rules is simply a frame {w1 £ t1, . . . , wa m £ ta m }. During the procedure, new facts are inferred. For instance, if w1 £ enc(a, b) and w2 £ b, we may add dec(w1, w2) £ a.
Equations ∀β.M N in Ψ correspond to relations that are visible to the intruder: intuitively any two computations M µ and N µ, dom(µ) ⊆ β, yield the same result when parameters are substituted with their actual values. For instance, given the two rules w1 £ h(n) and w2 £ n, a visible equation is w1 h(w2).
C is a set of constraints: either deducibility constraints X £ ? t, meaning that t must be computable by the intruder using a (yet) unknown recipe X, or equality constraints t1 = ? R t2, so as to account for tests done by honest participants. Finally, σ is used to record the solved variables of a system.
A closed (well-formed) substitution θ with dom(θ) = Y is a solution to Σ = Φ; Ψ; C; σ, written θ |= Σ, iff there exists a closed (well-formed) substitution λ with dom(λ) ⊇ var(Σ) such that:
• for every constraint X £ ? t in C, there exist an mary (public closed) context C, some rules ∀β1.M1 £ t1 . . . ∀βm.Mm £ tm ∈ Φ, some closed substitutions µ1 . . . µm with dom(µi) ⊆ βi such that • for every equation t1 = ? R t2 in C, t1λ =R t2λ;
• λ extends σ, in the sense that σλ = λ;
• λ is related to θ, meaning that for all X ∈ Y, we have Xθ = R∪Ψλ Xλ.
We have used = R∪Ψλ to denote the equivalence relation associated to the rewriting rules in R and the equations in Ψλ-seen as pairs of rewriting rules, one for each direction. We may write θ, λ |= Σ to specify a λ associated to a solution θ.
Intruder constraint systems of Section 2 are seen as extended constraint systems Σ = Φ; ∅; C; ∅ where, using the notations of Section 2, we let Φ = {w1 £ t1, . . . , wa m £ ta m } and
R s n }. Solutions to such a Σ are defined equivalently using the definition of intruder constraint systems or that of extended constraint systems. Notice that, due to the regularity conditions on intruder constraint systems (Section 2), for every solution θ, there exists a unique λ (up to =R, once restricted to var(Σ) ) such that θ, λ |= Σ.
A constraint system Σ = Φ; Ψ; C; σ is pre-solved iff C is of the form above, that is, the right-hand sides of deducibility constraints X £ ? t in C are pairwise distinct variables. It is solved iff besides C contains no equality constraints t1 = ? R t2.
Fact 2. Every solved constraint system Σ is satisfiable.
Indeed, let λ0 assign fresh public constants to every unsolved variable in Σ, ensuring that Xλ0 = xλ0 for each X £ ? x in Σ, but for any other pair of unsolved variables v1, v2, v1λ = v2λ. Let λ = σλ0 and define θ as the restriction of λ to Y. Then θ is a solution to Σ. In the following, we call such a θ a principal solution of Σ.
Our goal in the next subsection is to describe a set of transformation rules that is sound and complete in the following sense: for all intruder constraint system Σ = Φ; ∅; C; ∅ with Φ and C written as above,
• (soundness) for every Σ , if Σ =⇒ * Σ and θ |= Σ then θ |= Σ; moreover the set of equations Ψ of Σ is sound w.r.t. Σ: for all ∀β.M N in Ψ , if θ, λ |= Σ and θ, λ |= Σ , we have that
• (completeness) if θ |= Σ then there exists a solved constraint system Σ such that Σ =⇒ * Σ and θ |= Σ .
All these notions are motivated by the following characterization for the satisfiability and the equivalence of intruder constraint systems. Proposition 1. Let =⇒ be a sound and complete set of transformation rules.
1. An intruder constraint system Σ is satisfiable iff there exists a solved system Σ such that Σ =⇒ * Σ . (a) Every solution to Σ1 is a solution to Σ2.
(b) For every solved constraint system Σ such that Σ1 =⇒ * Σ, every ( resp. at least one) principal solution θ of Σ satisfies: (i) θ, λ2 |= Σ2 for some λ2 and (ii) for every equation
Provided that =⇒ is effective, this entails a semi-decision procedure for testing (non-)inclusion of sets of solutions: enumerate all the solved constraints systems reachable from Σ1 and check conditions (i) and (ii) on each of them. Moreover, if =⇒ is finitely-branching and terminates, then by König's Lemma, the number of reachable solved constraint systems is finite, so we obtain a decision procedure.
Transformation Rules for Convergent Rewriting Systems
We now describe a set of transformation rules that is sound and complete for any convergent rewriting system. Let am = max{ar(Y ) | Y ∈ Y} be the maximal arity of the second-order variables in Y. We consider the two groups of transformation rules presented in Table 1 .
The first three rules, Project, Imitate and Coalesce, aim to simplify deducibility constraints and bring constraint systems into a pre-solved form. The other rules in this paper only apply to constraint systems that are already pre-solved.
Specifically, rule Project uses a frame rule of Φ to solve a deducibility constraint in C. By fresh renaming, we mean that ρ may substitute variables in M with distinct variables not occurring in the system yet. This is useful both for instantiating quantified variables with fresh copies and for lowering arities of second-variables so as to keep σ wellformed. Rule Imitate decomposes a deducibility constraint into smaller constraints by applying a public symbol in head position. Rule Coalesce merges deducibility constraints which deal with the same first-order variables.
It is not hard to prove that this set of three rules terminates. Indeed, Imitate and Coalesce create no first-order variables and decrease the total size of right-hand sides of deducibility constraints. Project either reduces the number of unsolved first-order variables (if dom(µ) = ∅) or decreases the size of deducibility constraints as well.
The next five rules constitute the main loop of the procedure. We discuss later their termination on convergent subterm rewriting systems. As already mentioned, these rules are restricted to pre-solved constraint systems. Hence, an application of any of those is generally followed by a number of Project, Imitate and Coalesce steps.
Rules Narrowing-1, Narrowing-2 and Constrain are classical (see e.g. [16, 12] ). By "l → r fresh from R", we mean that the rewriting rule l → r is obtained by renaming the variables of some rule in R so that they do not occur in the left-hand constraint system. Rules Narrowing-1, Narrowing-2 aim to guess possible reductions resp. in computable terms and in equality constraints. Rule Constrain tries to solve an equality constraint by syntactic unification.
Rule Context accounts for reductions that occur at the top of computable terms. An example of application of this rule is the following. Assume that M1 £ enc(a, x0) is in Φ and X0 £ ? x0 in C. Assume a fresh rewriting rule l → r = dec(enc(x, y), y) → x from R and fresh variables X, X1, X2 of maximal arity. If Σ = Φ; Ψ; C; σ is pre-solved then we have the following sequence of reductions:
where the dots (. . . ) stand for the previous substitutions. Thus, we have inferred the new fact dec(M1, X0) £ a, by applying decryption at the top of computable terms (or supposedly computable terms in the case of x0). Rule Relate is needed for the completeness of Coalesce. It tries to find new visible equations, that is, different ways to obtain a same computable term.
We now state the soundness and the completeness of the transformation rules for any convergent rewriting system R. Proposition 2 (Soundness). Let Σ0 = Φ0; ∅; C0; ∅ be an intruder constraint system with Φ0 = {w1 £ t1, . . . , ta m £ ta m }. Let Σ0 =⇒ * Σ be a derivation using the rules of Table 1 . If θ |= Σ then θ |= Σ0. Moreover, the set of rules Φ and equations Ψ of Σ are sound w.r.t. Σ0: for all θ, λ0 |= Σ0 and θ, λ |= Σ,
The proof of soundness is done as expected by induction on the derivation. The cases of rules Project, Imitate, Coalesce, Narrowing-2, Constrain are straightforward. Yet, our proof for Narrowing-1, Context and Relate relies on a number of syntactic invariants. Notably, we establish the following important invariant, originating from the regularity condition (2) on intruder constraint systems:
For every ∀β.M £ t in Φ and x ∈ var(t), there exists X £ ? t in C such that x ∈ var(t ) and either X ∈ var(∀β.M ) or ar(X) < max{i | wi ∈ par(M )}.
Intuitively each variable occurring in a deducible term t with ∀β.M £ t ∈ Φ is constrained by a second-order variable at a lower level than M .
Proposition 3 (Completeness).
Let Σ0 be an intruder constraint system. If θ |= Σ0, then there exists a solved constraint system Σ and a derivation Σ0 =⇒ * Σ using the rules of Table 1 such that θ |= Σ.
Completeness is shown by instrumenting the rules of Table 1 with the considered solution θ, that is intuitively by defining transformations rules of the form (θ, λ |= Σ) =⇒ (θ, λ |= Σ ). We successively prove the correctness of the instrumented rules (that is the symbol |= is actually preserved), their progression (if the system is not solved, at least one rule applies) and their termination.
Enforcing Termination on Convergent Subterm Rewriting Systems
We now assume a convergent subterm rewriting system R and show how to enforce the termination of the transformation rules.
We have already proved the termination of rules Project, Imitate and Coalesce. Concerning the narrowing rules, we enforce termination by using a variant of the basic narrowing strategy (see e.g. [12] ). Specifically, we augment constraint systems with a fifth component N , standing for a set of firstorder terms. The set N is meant to store terms known to be R-reduced. Semantically, θ is a solution to Σ = Φ; Ψ; C; σ; N for some λ iff θ, λ |= Ψ; Ψ; C; σ in the previous sense and for all t ∈ N , tλ is R-reduced. Hence, terms which appear in N need not be narrowed anymore. Initially, that is for intruder constraint systems, N is set to ∅. We write st(N ) for the set of subterms of terms in N .
The case of rule Context is more problematic as it may introduce new variables indefinitely. We address this issue by introducing four additional transformation rules, meant to be applied eagerly on pre-solved constraint systems.
The new set of transformation rules is presented in Table 2. We have omitted rules Imitate and Coalesce which are the same as in Table 1 , except for the additional component N which is left unchanged.
As suggested, rules Narrowing-{1,2} now require that the narrowed term t|p (resp. (t1 =R t2)|p) do not belong to st(N ). Rules Project and Relate add their argument t to N in order to prevent further narrowing inside t. Similarly, rule Constrain records the unified term t1µ as being Rreduced.
Interestingly, rules Narrowing-{1,2} and Context tag their result rσ as being R-reduced as well. This is crucial for the termination of the algorithm as it entails that the number of positions p eligible for narrowing steps does not increase with rule Context and strictly decreases with rules Narrowing-{1,2}.
As for the new rules, the two simple rules Clean-1 and Clean-2 delete useless variables in the system. In the same vein, rule Generalize adds universal quantifiers on secondorder variables X which appear free in frame rules and equations but nowhere else. This aims to reduce the number of rules and equations, since these are considered modulo renaming of bound variables.
Rule Discard is a variant of Relate used to remove frame rules ∀β.M £t that are intuitively subsumed by existing rules ∀βi.Mi £ ti and existing constraints Xj £ ? xj, provided that a new equation is added to Ψ. The last two technical conditions in the premisses ensure the completeness of Discard when it is applied eagerly.
We now make precise the control on transformation rules, that is which sequences of rules need to be considered by the algorithm. For simplicity, we assume that the unification procedure tries to match its second argument against the first one whenever possible. In other words, mgu(t, l) = σ whenever var(t) ∩ var(l) = ∅ and t = lσ. The choice of the arity am + 1 rather than am for Context and Related is only to ensure that rule Coalesce substitutes these fresh second-order variables in priority.
Let Σ be an intruder constraint system. A sequence of transformations (derivation) Σ =⇒ * Σ by the rules of Table 2 is standard iff it has the following structure:
• If Σ1 occurs before Σ2 in the derivation, with Σi = Φi; Ψi; Ci; σi; Ni, and both constraint systems are presolved and saturated for the last four rules, Discard, Clean-{1,2} and Generalize, then Φ1; Ψ1; C1; σ1 = Φ2; Ψ2; C2; σ2.
• Rules Narrowing-{1,2}, Constrain, Context, Relate are always followed by a maximal sequence of Project, Imitate, Coalesce, and then, if a pre-solved form is reached, by maximal sequences of Discard, Clean-1, Clean-2 and Generalize, in this order.
Finally, we state our main theorem.
Theorem 2. Standard derivations form a sound, complete, effective and finitely branching (up to renaming) transformation system. Moreover there exists no infinite standard derivation.
We deduce the decision result of Theorem 1 using König's Lemma and Proposition 1. The proofs of soundness and completeness follow the same structure as previously. For rules Narrowing-{1,2} and Context, the fact that rσ may be added to N is justified by the following property of subterm rewriting systems: if f (t1 . . . tn) = lµ for some rewriting rule l → r ∈ R, and all the t1 . . . tn are R-reduced then rµ is reduced. This property together with the convergence of R turns out to be sufficient to imply the completeness of standard derivations.
As for the proof of termination, due to the constraints on narrowing positions, the rules Narrowing-{1,2} terminate independently from the other rules. So does rule Constrain, as well as the last four rules of Table 2 . Let Σ0 =⇒ * Σ be a standard derivation such that Σ is presolved and saturated for Discard, Clean-{1,2} and Generalize. Let e σ be the composition of all the substitutions applied during it. Concerning Context and Relate, we prove that each deducible term t in Σ is of the form t e σ where t is a subterm of a term t 0 intuitively the narrowed version of a deducible term in Σ0, now in N . (More precisely t 0 is the value corresponding to an initial term in Φ 0 after it was added to N , as the system was pre-solved again for the first-time). Thanks to rule Discard, we obtain that the number of rules in Φ exploitable by Context and Relate is bounded, and deduce the termination for the whole set of rules.
CONCLUSION
In this work we described a class of second-order E-unification problems and provided a terminating procedure to decide their satisfiability and their equivalence, in the case where the equational theory E is presented by a convergent subterm rewriting system. This decision result is interesting by itself as it is not implied by previous work in the area, e.g. [16, 21, 17] .
A major application, for which these constraint systems were intended, is the security of cryptographic protocols against off-line guessing attacks. No previous decision results existed for such properties, in any case, not using the recent general definition of Corin et al. [10] . Using our main result, we recovered the decidability of trace properties, and proved the decidability of security against of off-line guessing attacks for a bounded number of sessions.
As future work, we foresee to apply our notion of equivalence between symbolic traces to other security properties, such as strong secrecy and resistance to on-line guessing attacks. On the long term an interesting avenue would be to extend our result to equational theories involving algebraic properties such as associativity-commutativity, XOR or homomorphism. Each of the last five rules additionally requires its left-hand constraint system to be pre-solved, that is, saturated for the first three rules. The five rules from Narrowing-1 to Relate additionally require their left-hand constraint systems to be pre-solved and saturated for the last four rules. Each of the last four rules requires its left-hand constraint system to be pre-solved and saturated for the higher rules in this group.
